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Patent Inflation
Jonathan Masur†

Introduction
The shape of patent law is defined in large degree by the interaction between its two main
expositors: the Federal Circuit and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). Intervention from
Congress and the Supreme Court comes rarely—Congress has not significantly modified the
Patent Act in the past 50 years, and the Supreme Court has generally been reluctant to weigh in
on many of the most significant patent questions. In their absence, the Federal Circuit and the
PTO have arrived at an uneasy institutional détente. The Federal Circuit dictates the terms of
substantive patent law to the patent office, which typically abides by those terms and works to
placate both the Federal Circuit and the patent applicants who come before it.
Yet this structural accord has not well served the patent system or the private parties who
rely on it. In recent years both the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit have
received trenchant criticism for their handling (and mishandling) of patent applications and
patent cases. Critics have leveled two particular charges: first, that the PTO grants too many
invalid patents; and second, that the Federal Circuit has presided over a dramatic (and
unwarranted) expansion of what may be patented.1 These failures have been chalked up to a
number of potential causes: funding shortfalls at the PTO; internal management problems at the
PTO; a lack of expertise at the PTO or the Federal Circuit; capture by private interests; and,
perhaps most importantly, a simple ideological preference for greater numbers of patents over a
broader range of technologies.2
It is entirely possible that these various factors, singly and in combination, have
contributed to the significant numbers of invalid patents and the expansion in patentability. Yet
this article intends to offer a different and novel explanation. These types of patent
dysfunction—an overly permissive PTO, and an overly expansive Federal Circuit—may simply
be the results of the contorted institutional relationship between the two organizations. Because
of the manner in which patent cases make their way from the PTO to the Federal Circuit, the
PTO has a decided institutional interest in granting more patents than it should. And because of
this same interaction, the Federal Circuit may be engaged in an unwitting expansion of the
boundaries of patent law.
The key lies with the asymmetric nature of appeals from the PTO to the Federal Circuit.
When the PTO denies a patent application, the aggrieved private party may appeal immediately
to the Federal Circuit. When the PTO grants a patent, however, there is no losing party to
appeal—the victorious applicant merely walks away with its patent. That patent is unlikely ever
†

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Scott Hemphill, Mark Lemley, David
McGowan, Ben Roin, Dave Schwartz, and Matt Stephenson for helpful conversations, and Karen Bradshaw, Hanna
Chung, Faye Paul, Anthony Sexton, and Nathan Viehl for excellent research assistance.
1
See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
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to see the inside of a courtroom, given how few infringement lawsuits are litigated, and at
minimum it will be many years before it does. If the PTO wishes to avoid lawsuits, it need only
err on the side of allowing excessive numbers of patents, even invalid patents. A preponderance
of the cases that reach the Federal Circuit will thus involve inventions that are unpatentable
under governing law. These cases will offer the Federal Circuit the opportunity to either reject
the patent under existing law, preserving the law as it stands, or grant the patent under a new,
more expansive understanding of what is patentable. If the Federal Circuit decides any of these
cases in favor of the applicant, the boundaries of patentability will expand. The result will be
subject a natural inflationary pressure generated entirely by the types of cases that the PTO sends
to the Federal Circuit.
Despite the apparent complexity of these effects, they rely on only three apparently
innocuous factors. First, the PTO—through its administrators—pursues its own organizational
interests; second, the Federal Circuit is composed of heterogeneous judges who do not always
agree on the proper content of patent law; and third, appeal from a PTO decision may be taken
only by an aggrieved applicant whose patent has been denied. Using only those three
institutional features of the patent system, this article builds a model of the interaction between
the PTO, Federal Circuit, and patent applicants that generates improperly granted patents and an
inexorable expansion of the frontiers of patent law.
The interaction between the PTO and the Federal Circuit—and the results it generates—
are so remarkable because the asymmetry that generates them is so rare. Nearly every type of
litigation or administrative proceeding produces winning and losing parties, either of whom can
appeal to the federal courts (if appeal is available). This is of course true for civil and criminal
trials, and it is true as well for essentially every federal administrative action, from the
promulgation of major regulations3 to individual funding4 or permitting decisions.5 The patent
system thus stands nearly alone, with potentially significant consequences for patentees and
consumers alike.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the complaints that scholars
and stakeholders have registered against the Patent and Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit,
and the patents (and patent law) that they have jointly produced. Part II explains and analyzes the
interaction between the PTO and Federal Circuit, beginning with a simple model and building
toward a nuanced description that incorporates the characteristics and motivations of the
individuals in charge of those institutions. Part III presents a case study of the relationship

3

E.g., Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (challenge to EPA regulation
creating a “bubble rule” for new sources of pollution).
4
E.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (citizen suit to block Secretary of
Transportation from releasing highway construction funds).
5
E.g., Carolina Environmental Study Group v. U.S., 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (third-party challenge to Atomic
Energy Commission order granting permission to construct two new nuclear reactors). Indeed, it appears that there
are only two other administrative systems in which an aggrieved individual may appeal an adverse decision by the
government but neither the government nor a third party may appeal a decision favorable to the individual: claims
before the Social Security Administration for Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability Insurance,
see 42 U.S.C. § 405 (procedural rules for SSI/SSDI claims), and decisions by immigration law judges regarding
removal and asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (procedural rules for appeals from decisions by immigration judges).
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between the PTO and Federal Circuit involving the evolving rules regarding the patentability of
software and business methods that culminated in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski.
I.

Patent Problems

There is by now a broad consensus that the United States patent system is rife with flaws
and inadequacies.6 The “patent crisis,” as more than one commentator has termed it,7 has become
so severe that in many cases patents are now believed to retard innovation more than they
promote it.8 Critics of the patent system have pointed to two particular problems. First, the PTO
does a poor job of examining patents, allowing far too many invalid patents to issue.9 Second,
the Federal Circuit has pushed the law in an excessively pro-patent direction, broadening the
scope of patentable subject matter and endowing patentees with unwarranted power.10
Critics have ascribed these failures to a wide range of causes. Some have pointed to the
PTO’s lack of funding, which forces the agency to spend relatively little time scrutinizing each
patent.11 Others have argued that the PTO is hamstrung by poor management.12 Some scholars
have placed blame on the fact that both the PTO and the Federal Circuit appear to lack genuine
expertise in the technologies involved in modern patents.13 Others allege that the PTO and the
6

See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put
Innovators at Risk (2008); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It
(2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2004).
7
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 6 (starting from the premise that a crisis exists within the patent system);
Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 Harv. J.L. &
Tech. 123 (2006) (describing a patent crisis in high-technology fields); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights
Movement's Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 Ecology L.Q. 713, 737
(2007) (describing a “growing patent crisis”); Nat'l Academies of Sci., A Patent System for the 21st Century (2004)
(same); U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and
Policy ch. 3 (2003) (same).
8
See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 6, at 124 (arguing that biotechnology is the only field in which patents increase
innovation).
9
E.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at
the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495 (2001); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6, at 32-33 (2004); Michael A. Heller
& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE
698 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of a crowded patent field on innovation and market entrance); Doug
Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption Of Validity, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 45 (2007);
Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 675 (2009); Mark Lemley, Douglas
Lichtman, & Bhaven Sampat, What to do About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION 12–13 (2005) (describing the
problems generated by substantial numbers of invalid patents).
10
E.g., Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6, at 36; Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of
Competition and Patent Law and Policy 5 (2003), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; Jay
Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 Akron L. Rev. 299 (2005).
11
E.g., Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's Troubled Quest for Managerial
Control, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2051 (2009); Rochell Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure,
104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2006); Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6, at 124; Lemley, supra note 9, at 1508 (noting
the negative effects of funding shortages).
12
E.g., Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6, at 42; Rai, supra note 11, at 2062; Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai,
Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2008); Lichtman & Lemley, supra
note 9, at 60.
13
E.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (finding that the Federal Circuit has been only mildly
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Federal Circuit have been captured by private, pro-patent interests.14 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, some observers believe that the Federal Circuit simply holds an ever-increasing
ideological preference for greater numbers of patents over a broader range of technologies.15
Regardless of the exact cause, invalid patents and permissive, pro-patent rules have
imposed undeniable costs on inventors and consumers alike. Invalid, improperly granted patents
can dissuade potential competitors from entering a market and stunt investment in further
research.16 They raise search costs for market entrants, who must scrutinize the intellectual
property that exists in a given field and investigate those patents’ validity, lest a competitor later
force them out of the market.17 Invalid patents can also hamper a firm’s ability to raise capital18
or write contracts with potential customers.19 Financial markets will be wary of firms that may
not be sustainable because they traffic in infringing products. Customers will hesitate before
forming business relationships that may expose them to suits for contributory infringement and

successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable doctrine of claim construction); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES &
JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 299-327 (4th ed. 2007) (describing
the Federal Circuit’s struggles with the written description requirement); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats:
Contending With the “Written Description" Requirement (And Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 60-61 (2000) (same); Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1565 (noting that the PTO does not have
economists and other experts on staff).
14
E.g., Dreyfus, supra note 11; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It
106-07 (2009) (arguing that the PTO is subject to capture); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent Quality
Mechanisms 25 (Jan. 6, 2009), http:// www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/apr17/docs/rwagner2.pdf
(suggesting the influence that repeat players can have on PTO behavior); Meurer, supra note 9, at 686 (same);
Clarissa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1965 (2009) (suggesting
that the PTO has invited capture in order to increase its own stature); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792-94 (2003) (suggesting that the Federal Circuit has been captured). But see
John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Suggestion for Appellate Review of Questions in
Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 657, 685-86 (2009) (dismissing arguments that the Federal Circuit has been
captured).
15
E.g., Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6, at 137; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 6, at 69 (suggesting that the Federal
Circuit has been “pro-patent”); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law 335 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit has indeed turned out to be a pro-patent court”).
16
See Ian Ayres & Paul Klempere, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The
Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 985, 1018–20 (1999); Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of a crowded patent field on innovation and market entrance);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 101 (2006)
(analyzing the harm that even unenforced patents can do to competitors and consumers within the marketplace).
17
See id. at 132–37; Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights to Innovation, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
863, 870-81 (2007); Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344–47
(Fed. Cir. 2004); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 13, at 615–616 (describing the economics of search costs).
18
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy,
ch. 2, at 8 (2003) (“The threat of being sued for infringement by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless
claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital financing.”) (quoting testimony of Professor Joshua Lerner, Opening
Statement, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/lernerjosh.pdf).
19
Leslie, supra note 16, at 125–27.
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resist relying upon suppliers who may be shut down or driven out of the market by a lawsuit.20
Finally, invalid patents raise licensing and litigation costs.21
More broadly speaking, patents “involve[] a fundamental tradeoff between dynamic and
static efficiency: patents spur innovation but only at the cost” of higher prices for current
consumers.22 If too many patents are granted on too many inventions, or if the courts allow
patents to become too powerful, the balance could tilt against patents as socially useful devices.
If patents no longer provided a significant incentive for innovation, they might not be worth the
costs they impose upon consumers.23
In response to the inadequacies of the patent office and Federal Circuit, and the costs of
bad patents, scholars have advanced a number of proposals for reform. Some have argued that
the PTO should receive additional funding, enabling it to hire more and better examiners.24
Others have suggested that patent examinations should be eliminated altogether, with patent
examination reverting to a simple system of registration akin to the copyright regime.25 Still
others have argued that the problems should be left to the federal courts to sort out.26
Many of these proposals have been coupled with suggestions for meaningful inter partes
post-grant administrative review, mechanisms by which potential infringers can challenge a
patent’s validity without undertaking expensive litigation in federal courts.27 Some scholars
recommend a multi-tiered system of patent review in which applicants can opt for one of several
20

See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit—Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 634, 641 (1950)
(“Contributory infringement . . . can serve as an effective side-attack to cut off the economic support of a small
producer.”).
21
See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L.
Rev. 509, 515 (2003); Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.) (describing a
patent as a “scarecrow” that can deter competition by its very existence).
22
Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 867; see also Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races
Over Auctions, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 803, 809-10 (2007) (“This trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is
familiar to patent scholarship.”); Note, Limiting the Anticompetitive Prerogative of Patent Owners: Predatory
Standards in Patent Licensing, 92 Yale L.J. 831, 836 (1983) (“The patent system that Congress created reflects a
tradeoff between dynamic and static efficiency.”); DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 6 (1998);
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 253–
256 (2007) (describing the incentive systems meant to drive the patent law).
23
Gideon Parchomovsky, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455, 1471 (2002)
(suggesting the limits at which the losses due to static inefficiency outweigh the gains in dynamic efficiency).
24
See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent
Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004); Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6 (proposing that the patent office expend greater
funds on more rigorous examination); Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 12–13; John R. Allison, On the Feasibility of
Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729
(2006); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
25
Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law
and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003).
26
BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 6, at 112-15; Lemley, supra note 9, at 1508–11 (arguing that further investment in
patent scrutiny, because it must be spread across hundreds of thousands of patents per year, would result in little
gain in the quality of issued patents).
27
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 943
(2004); Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6, at 176.
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levels of PTO scrutiny with correspondingly strong ex post presumptions of validity.28 And even
more exotic proposals abound, including suggestions for tradable patent rights that would limit
the number of patents in force at any given time,29 or even private competition in the market for
patent examination.30 Finally, some commentators have begun to suggest abolishing the Federal
Circuit entirely and returning to the prior system of jurisdictional competition between the
generalist courts of appeal.31
Finding the correct solution depends, of course, on correctly diagnosing the problem. It is
possible that some or all of the factors described above—funding, management, lack of
expertise, capture, and ideology32—have contributed to the proliferation of invalid patents and
the unflagging expansion of patent rights. Nonetheless, this article aims to demonstrate that the
patent system’s failings can be explained instead as a consequence of the contorted institutional
relationship between the PTO and the Federal Circuit.
II.

Patent Expansion

This Part presents a model of the interaction between three principal actors: the Federal
Circuit; the PTO; and a patent applicant. This basic model proceeds in four stages. First, the
patent applicant applies to the PTO for a patent. Second, the PTO decides whether to grant the
patent. Officially, the PTO is an agent of the Federal Circuit; its role is to grant only those
patents that the Federal Circuit would allow under governing law.33 Third, if the PTO denies the
patent, the applicant decides whether to appeal that denial to the Federal Circuit.34 And fourth,
the Federal Circuit decides the appeal (if there is one).

28

See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra note 9, at 12–13; Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—
Proposals for Decreasing Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 119 (2005).
29
Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 17, at 870. But see Abramowicz, supra note 22, at 815 (arguing that the
government is ill-suited to determining when patent auctions should be held).
30
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1541 (2009)
(suggesting that private patent examination firms be allowed to compete with the USPTO).
31

E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 787, 804 (2008) (“Another idea would be to abolish the Federal Circuit and reconstitute it as a
trial court.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
Colum. L. Rev. 1035, 1102 (2003) (“I discuss whether the best solution would involve abolishing the Federal
Circuit, and having a system of specialized trial courts reviewed by generalist appellate courts.”).
32
See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
33
Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 1415 (1995) (explaining the legal
relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit).
34
To be precise, inventors whose patents rejected by the PTO examiner may appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (BPAI), an administrative court located within the PTO. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (“The Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, review adverse decisions of examiners
upon applications for patents . . . .”); John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional
(unpublished manuscript 2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1128311. As later sections will
explain, however, the BPAI is under the control of the top PTO administrators and functions as an arm of the
agency. See infra note 73. Because these administrators control all significant decision-makers within the agency,
and in the interest of simplicity, I will refer to the PTO as if it were a unitary actor, rather than distinguishing
between examiners and the BPAI.
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Following attitudinal models of judging, which describe judges as having an “ideal
point” —the point along a continuum of possible outcomes where they would prefer the law to
land—the model describes Federal Circuit judges as having an “ideal point” regarding
patentability.36 That is, along any given dimension of patentability (utility, nonobviousness, etc.)
each judge, were she left to her own devices, would draw a line at a given point and allow
patents up to that point and no further. This ideal point is better described as a “cutpoint,” in the
sense that it represents the cutoff between patentability and non-patentability.37 These cutpoints
can be represented graphically. For instance, Figure 1below displays a hypothetical PTO cutpoint
on the issue of utility:
35

Figure 1: The PTO Cutpoint on Utility
PTO cutpoint
Extremely useful
invention

Invention for which no
utility can be demonstrated

One can imagine the universe of possible inventions arrayed on the line from left to right
in order of decreasing utility: on the far left are inventions that have obvious and incontrovertible
demonstrated utility; on the far right are inventions with no demonstrated utility. The PTO will
grant patents on inventions that fall to the left of its cutpoint and deny patents on inventions that
fall to the right of its cutpoint. The further to the right an actor’s cutpoint is located, the more
patents that actor would grant—and thus the more lenient or permissive would be that actor’s
standards for patentability.
There are of course many different dimensions to patentability. A patent must recite valid
subject matter,38 must be novel and nonobvious,39 must be useful,40 and so forth. Each actor—the
Patent and Trademark Office, and each judge of the Federal Circuit—has a cutpoint for each of
these issues. In addition, the Federal Circuit itself has a cutpoint that represents what patents it
would grant under its own governing precedent. For instance, the Federal Circuit and the PTO
might have the following cutpoints on the issue of patentable subject matter:
35

E.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557 (1989)
36
Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy On the United States Courts Of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of
Panel Effects, 157 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1319, 1347 (2009); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A
Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 769, 780-82 (2008) (explaining the use of ideal
points in decision models); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. Legal Stud. 1, 18-20
(2008) (employing an ideal point-based model)
37
Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jeffrey A. Segal, Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court
Justices: Who, When, And How Important?, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1483, 1529-30 (2007) (describing the lines
demarcating decisions between voting one way or the other on a case as cutpoints); Keith Krehbiel, Committee
Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence From the Smoking Ban, 12 J.L. Econ. & Org. 234, 253 (1996)
(employing a cutpoint-based model).
38
E.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (patentability of living organism).
39
KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (novelty).
40
E.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) (doctrine of specific utility); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (same).
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Figure 2: PTO and Federal Circuit Cutpoints on Patentable Subject Matter
Federal Circuit cutpoint

PTO cutpoint

Classically patentable
subject matter, such as
farm equipment

Highly dubious subject
matter, such as laws of
nature

In this example, the PTO is more permissive than the Federal Circuit, as represented by the fact
that its cutpoint is to the right of the Federal Circuit’s.
Two final notes are in order. First, the analysis that follows begins with the simplest case:
a completely error-free PTO and a completely error-free Federal Circuit, both of which grant all
patents to the left of their cutpoints and deny all patents to the right of their cutpoints. This is
obviously unrealistic; no court or agency can be perfectly accurate in all circumstances. Any
actor will occasionally grant patents that are to the right of its cutpoint or deny patents that are to
the left of its cutpoint on occasion, purely as a matter of error or internal disagreements within an
institution.41 This is merely to establish the basic building blocks of the model. Later sections
drop the assumption of perfect accuracy and present a realistic picture of the interaction between
the PTO and the Federal Circuit.
Second, the analysis proceeds as if there were only one dimension to patentability, and it
often speaks of “patentability” as a placeholder for any of the various doctrines that determine
whether an application is patentable. Nonetheless, it is entirely generalizable to any number of
dimensions—what is true for one dimension will be true for all of them.
A.

Error-Free PTO and Federal Circuit

Consider first an error-free PTO, an error-free and entirely homogenous Federal Circuit,
and a strategic patent applicant. The Federal Circuit will set the appropriate limits of
patentability, and the PTO will follow those limits to the letter. Under these circumstances, the
PTO will grant only those patents that are genuinely patentable under governing Federal Circuit
law, and because the PTO makes no errors the Federal Circuit will uphold its decision if any
aggrieved patentee appeals. Accordingly, strategic patentees will only apply for patents on
inventions that they know to be patentable. The system will function ideally.
B.

Error-Prone or Noisy PTO, Error-Free Federal Circuit

Now imagine that the PTO is not perfect but instead will make random errors when
examining patent applications, sometimes granting patents that it should not,42 and sometimes

41

For instance, some judges of the Federal Circuit may be more lenient than others, and an appeal may turn on
which panel of three judges is selected to hear it. I discuss this at greater length below.
42
Again, “should” is meant in reference to governing Federal Circuit law. The PTO should grant all patents that are
allowable according to the Federal Circuit and should deny all patents that are not.

August 9, 2010

PATENT INFLATION

10

denying patents that should be granted.43 The errors will cluster around the PTO’s cutpoint: the
closer an application is to the cutpoint, the more likely the PTO is to err in examining it.44 In
other words, the PTO will be less likely to incorrectly decide patent applications that are
obviously patentable or obviously unpatentable. Figure 3 represents this phenomenon
graphically. The shaded area represents the set of patent applications that the PTO might decide
incorrectly; the darker the shading, the more likely the PTO is to err.
Figure 3: The PTO’s Cutpoint in General
PTO cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

The PTO thus produces four types of decisions: false negatives (patents it should grant
but denies instead); false positives (patents it should deny but grants instead); true negatives
(patents it should deny and does); and true positives (patents it should grant and does). The
following table represents these categories graphically:
Figure 4: True and False Positives and Negatives at the PTO
PTO should
grant patent

PTO should
deny patent

PTO grants patent True positive

False positive

PTO denies
patent

True negative

False negative

Imagine further that the Federal Circuit is again error-free. When the PTO erroneously
denies a patent (a false negative), the aggrieved party can appeal to the Federal Circuit.45 The
Federal Circuit will then reverse the PTO. But when the patent office grants a patent, there is no
opposing private party positioned to challenge that patent in court, and thus no opportunity for
the Federal Circuit to correct the PTO’s error.46 Only PTO actions on one side of the ledger are
appealed directly to the federal courts.47 Strategic patent applicants will thus understand that
43

The precise source of the error is not important. One possibility is that these errors could be due to simple
mistakes by examiners and the difficulties inherent to accurately examining a patent.
44
This is the standard, intuitive assumption that drives all spatial models. See supra notes 36-37 and sources cited
therein.
45
This is relatively rare, of course. The far more common course of action is for the private party to file a series of
continuation patents with the patent office until the examiner finally agrees to grant the patent.
46
The PTO does provide for limited inter partes review of patents, but this procedure is very rarely used because it
is costly for the challenging party.
47
That is not to say that improperly granted patents never wind up in federal court. They do, in the context of
infringement actions. Yet they arrive there in smaller numbers, and after greater delay, than patents based on
applications denied. The next section explores this issue in greater detail.
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there is some chance that the PTO will grant them a patent on an unpatentable invention.
Accordingly, patent applicants will file some number of patent applications that they believe to
be unpatentable, hoping to get lucky at the PTO. The number of these attempts will depend on
the PTO’s rate of error and the cost of filing for a patent.48
Under these circumstances, if the costs of appealing the Federal Circuit are low enough,
few patents will be improperly denied: any applicant whose patent is wrongly denied can simply
appeal, and the Federal Circuit will grant the patent. However, some number of invalid patents
will be improperly granted by the PTO and never appealed. In that respect, this arrangement
bears some resemblance to reality—most observers agree that the patent system is rife with
improperly granted patents.49
C.

A Perfect PTO, An Error-Prone or Noisy Federal Circuit
1.

Issued Patents

Now imagine that the PTO is error-free—it grants or denies every application precisely in
accordance with governing Federal Circuit law. But suppose that the Federal Circuit is errorprone, or that its behavior is “noisy” with respect to its cutpoint. The Circuit will usually deny
applications that are to the right of the cutpoint (meaning that the patent would normally be
invalid under existing precedent) and approve applications that are to the left of the cutpoint
(meaning that the patent would be valid under existing precedent). However, it will occasionally
grant invalid patents or deny valid ones. Like the error-prone PTO from the prior section, the
Federal Circuit’s errors are clustered around its cutpoint. The more obviously patentable or
unpatentable an invention is, the less likely the Circuit is to decide the case improperly. Figure 5
represents this graphically:
Figure 5: The Federal Circuit’s Cutpoint, With Error Ranges
Federal Circuit
cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

This error or noise could derive from a variety of sources. It might be the result of the
technological difficulties inherent to ascertaining the patentability of an invention; even
experienced judges will frequently make legal errors.50 Alternatively, what appear to be errors in
Federal Circuit patent grants or denials might instead be the result of random panel assignments
within the circuit. The cutpoint for the Federal Circuit as a whole is determined by its median
48

See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens, Value Asymmetries, and Examination at the PTO, Journal of Legal
Analysis (forthcoming 2010), at 14 (cataloguing the costs involved in obtaining a patent).
49
See supra note 8 and sources cited therein.
50
David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent
Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2008). In addition, Federal Circuit judges may be experienced, but they are not
particularly expert. See supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
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judge—the judge who holds the deciding vote in en banc cases.51 But other judges may have
more or less expansive views of the scope of patentability than the median judge.52 If two judges
with more expansive or less expansive views of patentability find themselves on the same panel,
they may decide to issue a decision that deviates in one direction or another from the cutpoint of
the Federal Circuit as a whole.53
There is, however, the matter of existing precedent. Judges who disagree with the Federal
Circuit’s position on patentability will nonetheless feel bound to some degree by existing
precedent and unable to simply decide cases as they might wish.54 On the other hand, circuit
precedent is not entirely binding; judges do deviate from precedent on regular occasions,
especially in the Federal Circuit, where inconsistent, competing legal approaches often persist for
years.55 In keeping with standard legal and political science models of judicial behavior, the
model assumes that a judge’s likelihood of voting to grant a patent is a function of the judge’s
own view of patent law (that is, the judge’s cutpoint); existing circuit precedent (that is, the
Federal Circuit’s cutpoint); and where the patent itself falls relative to those cutpoints.56 The
farther the patent is to the left (right) of the judge’s cutpoint, the more likely the judge is to grant
(deny) the patent.57 And the farther a judge would have to deviate from existing precedent in
order to grant or deny a patent, the less likely she is to do so.58
Under these circumstances, patentees with patentable inventions will continue to apply
for patents. Their patents will always be granted by the PTO, and there will be no need to appeal
to the Federal Circuit. There will be no false negatives—patents that should be granted but are
not. However, some inventors with unpatentable inventions will also file for patents. They will
understand that after the PTO denies their applications they can appeal to the Federal Circuit, and
there is a chance that they will draw a favorable (or errant) panel that will overturn the PTO’s
decision and grant the patent. The number of such patentees who file for patents on unpatentable
inventions will deny will depend on the costs and benefits involved: the cost of applying for a
51

See William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 37, 44-49 (2008); Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1399, 1418-19
(2009) (“The median voter theorem states that outcomes and opinions are dictated exclusively by the
ideologicallymedian member of the panel.”).
52
See Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 421, 446-48 (2009) (finding substantial
differences in outcomes among judges).
53
See Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Appellate Judges: A Model of “Consensus Voting,” available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361348 (unpublished manuscript 2010).
54
W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward A Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1895, 1926
(2010) (“precedent constrains the discretion of future decision makers to some meaningful degree”).
55
See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (describing the intra-circuit conflict over the proper methodology of
patent claim construction).
56
This approach is drawn from spatial voting models and has gained wide acceptance. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 36,
at 1347 (using a spatial model to analyze judicial voting); Jonathan Bendor & Adam Meirowitz, Spatial Models of
Delegation, 98 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 293 (2004) (employing a spatial model to explain delegation decisions); Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 29 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 357 (1985)
(using a spatial model to explain congressional voting); Erik Voeten, Legislator Preferences, Ideal Points, and the
Spatial Model in the European Parliament (Inst. of Governmental Studies, Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2005)
(analyzing European voting with a spatial model).
57
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1207, 1223-30 (2007) (using a spatial model to explain judges’ statutory interpretation decisions).
58
Kim, supra note 36, at 1347-50.
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patent and appealing to the Federal Circuit, and the value of the patent if it issues, discounted by
the likelihood that the Federal Circuit will uphold the PTO’s decision. There may be few of these
patentees (depending on these parameters), but there will not be zero. In other words, this
institutional arrangement will in the end generate some false positives—patents granted by the
Federal Circuit that should not exist.
2.

The Contours of Patent Law

The effects of such a system do not end with the fact that some bad patents will issue. In
addition, this arrangement will have important, perhaps pernicious, consequences for the shape
of patent law itself. In any appeal from a denial by the PTO, the Federal Circuit has only two
options: a) affirm the patent office’s denial, or b) reverse the PTO and grant the patent. If the
Federal Circuit affirms the PTO, it will likely do so based on governing circuit precedent, which
of course the PTO followed.59 Patent law will remain unchanged. But if it reverses the PTO and
grants the patent, it will necessarily have created a new precedent, one that supports a broader
scope of patentability, and one that will exert an influence on Federal Circuit judges going
forward.
The strength of these new precedents—and thus the extent to which the boundaries of
patentability expand—will depend on the reason for the Federal Circuit’s departure from settled
law.60 If the Federal Circuit has simply misjudged the invention’s technology or misapplied the
law, the precedent will likely have little value.61 But where the Federal Circuit offers a new
statement of law, the new precedent will exert force.62 This is the case regardless of whether the
court states this new legal rule intentionally—as a consequence of the panel composition—or
unintentionally—as a result of error. These decisions will inflate the patent law, expanding the
range of what is patentable.
Moreover, these legal expansions by the Federal Circuit will generate positive feedback
effects. As the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint moves with the creation of new precedent, so too will
the PTO’s. (Again, the PTO is bound to enforce the Patent Act, as interpreted by the Federal
Circuit.63) Every time the Federal Circuit moves the law, the PTO will respond accordingly and
become slightly more permissive in granting patents. And because the only appeals that the
Federal Circuit will see relate to applications that exceed this new cutpoint, it will continuously
59

Cf. William A. Klein, Tailor to the Emperor with No Clothes: The Supreme Court's Tax Rules for Deposits and
Advance Payments, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1685, 1725 (1994) (describing the manner in which lawyers offer, and courts
generally follow, arguments based on existing precedent). It is possible that repeated affirmations of existing law
will effectively entrench those legal rules, making them more difficult to overturn. At the same time, it is possible
that these seriatim affirmances will have zero or little effect. Yet even if the Circuit’s many affirmances exert some
sort of inertial pull on patent law, this will only slow the rate of change, not eliminate it entirely.
60
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to elucidate an entire theory of precedent; instead, I rely here upon
standard existing theories of how precedent impacts judicial behavior. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1987); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. Leg. Stud. 51 (1977) (criticizing
the notion that the common law evolves toward efficiency and offering a more realistic account of judicial
behavior).
61
See id. at 591-96 (explaining that precedent will be of little value when it covers only a very narrow category of
cases).
62
See id. at 592-95 (categorizing the strength of legal precedents).
63
Nard, supra note 33, at 1432 (describing the PTO’s obligation to enforce the Federal Circuit’s version of the law).
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be presented with new opportunities to move the law even further. The inflationary cycle will
repeat itself.
This process is not wholly unconstrained, however. In the Federal Circuit, one panel
cannot overrule an opinion issued by another.64 Only the court sitting en banc may do so.65
Accordingly, no three-judge panel has the power to enact genuinely wholesale change.
Nonetheless, newer panel opinions can chip away at old doctrines by creating exceptions or
reaching opposite conclusions in analogous situations, even when they do not directly overrule
existing precedent.66 These new panel opinions then exert precedential force of their own in
future cases, even cases that the Federal Circuit hears en banc.67 In addition, the Federal Circuit
is infamous for allowing apparently contradictory panel opinions to co-exist for extended periods
of time. For instance, for several years the circuit had two separate doctrines of claim
interpretation.68 Both stemmed from panel opinions,69 and both claimed some number of
adherents until the court, sitting en banc, discarded one in favor of the other.70 Accordingly, the
fact that this effect is limited to panel opinions may curb its impact but will not eliminate it.
Still, the Federal Circuit will not function entirely as a one-way ratchet. The court could
always seize upon a patent that the PTO has denied as a vehicle for retrenchment. The Circuit
could use the case to move the boundaries of patentability backwards, rather than merely
affirming the PTO based on settled law. These cases will be rare, however, in part because they
require the judges of the Federal Circuit to deviate from settled precedent in service of an
outcome that they could achieve simply by adhering to that precedent.71
In addition, any patent the PTO has granted—from the most mundane and
uncontroversial to those at the vanguard of current law—could be the subject of an infringement
action, and thus the full panoply of allowed patents could still find their way to the Federal
Circuit at one point or another. Infringement lawsuits involving patents well within the scope of

64

This is in contrast to other Courts of Appeals that do allow one three-judge panel to overrule another. For
instance, Seventh Circuit Local Rule 40(e) states:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position which would overrule a prior
decision of this court or create a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the
issue of whether the position should be adopted.

Seventh Circuit Local Rule 40(e), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.htm.
65
Fed. Cir. Local Rule 35 (“Although only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent . . . .”), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/rules.pdf.
66
Schauer, supra note 60, at 589.
67
Id.
68
See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (explaining the history of the circuit’s rules on claim
construction).
69
One approach focused on the literal meaning of claim terms as interpreted using dictionaries, see Texas Digital
Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002); the other employed a more holistic approach. See
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
70
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (adopting the Vitronics approach).
71
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 384 n. 10 (1996) (expressing a reluctance to
decide cases on any broader or more difficult ground than absolutely necessary).
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existing law could provide the Federal Circuit with opportunities to dial back the reach of
patentable subject matter.
On the whole, will the scope of patentability expand or contract? This will depend on
how many true positives and true negatives come before the Federal Circuit. The true negatives
will be patent applications that are denied by the PTO and appealed directly to the Federal
Circuit; the true positives will be patents that the PTO properly grants that eventually find their
way to the Federal Circuit in the course of infringement lawsuits. (There will be no false
positives or false negatives because by hypothesis the PTO is unerring.) True positives (along
with false negatives) allow the Federal Circuit opportunities to contract the scope of
patentability, because reversing the PTO would involve narrowing the boundaries of what is
patentable. True negatives (and false positives) provide opportunities for expansion because
reversing the PTO involves broadening the boundaries of what is patentale. There will of course
be many more patents granted than denied by the PTO, but relatively few of those patents will
ever be subject to suits for infringement, much less suits that reach the Federal Circuit. As a
result, the overall effect on the scope of patentability is indeterminate—at least in this contrived
scenario. Given a more realistic picture of the PTO and Federal Circuit, the results are not so
indefinite.
D.

The Patent Office and Federal Circuit in Reality

The previous sections demonstrated that on certain assumptions the interaction between
the PTO and the Federal Circuit can generate both invalid patents and an inflationary (or
deflationary) bias in patent law. However, those assumptions were not all realistic, and
deliberately so. The preceding sections were meant only to lay the theoretical groundwork for an
analysis of the interaction between the two actual institutional bodies. This section takes up that
task.
1.

The PTO

This section begins with an account of what the Patent Office attempts to achieve when it
examines patents. As described above, the PTO’s official objective is to allow those patents that
would be valid under the best possible interpretation of governing law.72 Officially, then, the
PTO is expected to match its cutpoint to the Federal Circuit’s. The patent system is designed
such that the PTO’s official goal is to grant only valid patents, per the legal definitions created by
these other institutional actors, and to deny all other applications.
The PTO, as an institution, undoubtedly pursues this objective to at least some extent.
But from the perspective of the individuals who actually manage the PTO (and those who
examine patents), the PTO’s institutional interest in enforcing the “correct” boundaries of patent
law is actually quite weak.73 The patent rules are not the PTO’s own legal boundaries—they
72

Nard, supra note 33, at 1419-22.
Again, to be precise, inventors whose applications have been denied may appeal to the BPAI, an administrative
court within the PTO, before taking their cases before the Federal Circuit. See supra note 34; 35 U.S.C. § 6(b)
(establishing the BPAI). However, the BPAI is not an independent body; to the contrary, it resides under the control
of senior PTO officials. The membership of the BPAI includes the PTO Director, the Deputy Director, the

73
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were created by the Federal Circuit.74 Accordingly, there is no one at the PTO with any personal
investment in the contours of the rules, or anyone who stands to reap any psychic or reputational
benefits if the PTO holds fast to the patentability boundaries.75 Nor is there any indication that
PTO administrators are chosen based on their views of patent law and how those views accord
with governing Federal Circuit precedent.76 Adhering to the Federal Circuit’s conception of
patent law holds very little inherent value for the patent office.
What else might the PTO and its top administrators wish to achieve when granting or
denying patents? Like any administrative heads, top officials at the PTO are interested in
maximizing both their future career prospects and, to a lesser extent, their leisure time.77
Consider first the issue of an administrator’s career. The administrator’s future career
opportunities are driven in large degree by her reputation.78 Enhancing her own reputation

Commissioner for Patents, and the Commissioner for Trademarks, as well as administrative patent judges. 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a). These administrative patent judges are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce, “in consultation with the
Director” of the PTO. Id. (In effect, this means that the PTO Director controls the appointments.) The judges do not
have Article III tenure and salary protection and can be removed at will. Id. In addition, the PTO director has the
authority “to designate BPAI panels that’ he hopes will render the decision he desires, even upon rehearing.’” Duffy,
supra note 34, at 3 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Moreover, before a decision of the
BPAI acquires precedential force—before it can bind examiners or the BPAI itself in the future—that decision must
be approved by the PTO Director. United States Patent and Trademark Office OG Notices: 23 January 2007,
Publication of Opinions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2007/week04/patopin.htm. As a purely legal matter, it is undoubtedly
the case that BPAI judges are not “alter ego[s] or agent[s]” of the PTO Director. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1535-36. But
senior PTO administrators exert effective control the law that emanates from the BPAI (as well as the more
quotidian activities of examiners). Accordingly, the analysis will treat the interests of the agency at large as
mirroring those of its senior management.
74
Again, Congress and the Supreme Court certainly play a role in the creation of patent law, albeit a small one. This
role is discussed in greater detail in Part II.F., infra.
75
See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 40-41 (2008) (describing the set of theories positing that decisionmakers prefer to decide questions in accordance with views or ideas they have constructed).
76
Presidential and congressional statements regarding nominees to head the PTO are noticeably devoid of so much
as an allusion to the individual’s substantive views on patent law, as opposed to his or her managerial experience.
See, e.g., President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts, June 18, 2009, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Announces-More-Key-Administration-Posts-6-1809/ (Obama statement regarding PTO Director David Kappos); Comment On The Designation Of David J. Kappos
To Be Undersecretary Of Commerce For Intellectual Property And Director Of The U.S. Patent And Trademark
Office, June 18, 2009, available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=40766b3c-7fa3-4c74986e-d4378ae4665c (statement by Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, regarding
Kappos).
77
William A. Niskanen Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government 38 (1971) (“Among the several variables
that may enter the bureaucrat’s utility function are the following: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation,
power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau.”); Michael A.
Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 107, 120 (2008)
(“There is a wide variety of other goods that agency heads could pursue--such as prestige, nicer offices,
intellectually stimulating work, leisure time, and future employment prospects . . . .”); cf. Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44
Duke L.J. 1051, 1054 (1995) (arguing that “respect, ideological utility, and leisure” are judges’ maximands).
78
See Mary K. Olson, Managing Delegation in the FDA: Reducing Delay in New-Drug Review, 29 J. Health Pol.
Pol'y & L. 397, 401 (2004) (“FDA regulators care about their own professional reputations and the reputation of the
agency because these reputations may influence their career prospects in and out of government”).
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involves increasing the size, prestige, and resources of her administration,79 on the theory that
successfully managing an important organization demonstrates the administrator’s ability.80
In order to increase the size and importance of the PTO, the administrator must satisfy
those parties that control the agency’s budget: Congress and the President, and by extension the
community of private parties who interact with the PTO and may lobby political actors for or
against the agency.81 However, in the net these parties do not appear to have terribly strong
preferences regarding the substantive content of patent law. Congress and the President have not
passed major legislation altering the structure of patent law since 1952, which indicates a
willingness to cede the shaping of the law to the courts.82 Scholars believe that this political
apathy is due to the fact that private interests are arrayed approximately equally for and against
expansion in the scope of patent rights.83 Notwithstanding this apparent equality, the PTO has
assumed at least a public posture of solicitude towards patent applicants in general, the class of
private actors most likely to prefer expansive patent scope.84 The PTO refers to them as its
“customers” and states that its mission is to serve their interests in obtaining patents. 85 In the
aggregate, it is unlikely that Congress, the President, and private interests exert a strong pull on
PTO behavior. But if they do, it is likely in the direction of allowing more extensive patenting.86
By contrast, the Federal Circuit holds the power to significantly and directly affect the
interests of the PTO’s administrators. The mechanism is the possibility of appeal and reversal.
Like any administrative actor (or judge), officials at the PTO place a high value on avoiding
being reversed.87 Reversals by the Federal Circuit are costly in reputational terms and can
79

NISKANEN, supra note 77, at 38 (describing a bureaucrat’s reputation as “a positive monotonic function of the
total budget of the bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office”); Andre Blais and Stephane Dion, The BudgetMaximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence 6 (1991) (“strategies are mainly, but not exclusively targeted at
budgetary increases”).
80
Randall L. Calvert et al., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion, 33 Am. J. Poli. Sci. 588, 589-90
(1989); Mark Bagnoli & Michael McKee, Controlling the Game: Political Sponsors and Bureaus, 7 J.L. & Econ.
Org. 229, 230 (1991).
81
NISKANEN, supra note 77, at 24 (1971) (describing administrators’ desire to satisfy their financial sponsors); Long,
supra note 14 (suggesting that the PTO will often enlist the assistance of private parties in lobbying Congress for
additional funding).
82
Id. at 1968 (“Since 1952, Congress has not taken much interest in amending the patent code, leaving the bulk of
legal evolution to the courts.”).
83
Clarisa Long, Institutions and Interest Groups in Patent and Copyright Law, at 10 (unpublished manuscript 2007).
84
See supra note 9 (and sources cited therein).
85
See, e.g., WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW (1994 Annual Review),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pg1-5.pdf. This may of course be mere lip service.
86
At the level of the individual examiner, there is a bias towards granting patent applications. Examiners receive
bonuses based on how many applications they can process fully, JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 6, at 116, and the
quickest and easiest way for them to finish processing an application is to allow the patent. Id. at 136; cf. John
Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (2007) (noting that judges’ preferences for leisure time
will incline them to grant more motions for summary judgment than would otherwise be appropriate). One
suggestive study found that patent approval rates spike in September—the month in which the PTO’s accounting
year closes and examiners are awarded bonuses for processed applications. Gajan Retnasaba, Why it is Easier to Get
a Patent in September? (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1121132 (2008).
87
Albert A. Foer, The Politics of Antitrust in the United States: Public Choice and Public Choices, 62 U Pitt L Rev
475, nn. 42-43 (2001) (explaining that a concern for reputation may drive administrative heads to do a good job if
for no other reason than to maintain superior private-practice exist options); George A. Krause and James W.
Douglas, Institutional Design versus Reputational Effects on Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from US
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threaten top officials’ employment and public standing, not to mention their future employment
prospects.88 Moreover, even appeals that the PTO eventually wins are very costly to the agency.
Because the PTO is entirely self-funded and operates on a fixed budget,89 each dollar it spends
litigating is one it cannot devote to hiring additional examiners, improving the quality of the PTO
workspace, increasing the salaries of current employees, or otherwise providing material and
non-material benefits to the PTO workforce.90 Accordingly, even victorious appeals can reduce
the leisure time available to the PTO administrator and her subordinates.91 The Patent Office thus
has a strong incentive to avoid appeals, and in particular to avoid reversals.
2.

The Federal Circuit

With respect to the Federal Circuit, the story is much simpler. The Federal Circuit, as the
primary expositor of patent law, has a substantive, policy-driven interest in the content of the
law.92 Judges have individual policy preferences that shape their legal decisions. In addition, they
would prefer not to be overturned by the Supreme Court, a fact that limits their legal options to at
least some extent.93

Government Macroeconomic and Fiscal Projections, 15 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 281 (2005); cf. Hon. James
P. Timony, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 Admin L.J. 629, 656-57 (1993)
(explaining, with respect to administrative law judges, that “[j]udges generally are extremely cautious about their
professional reputation . . . . They do not like to be reversed on appeal.”).
88
Id. at 656; cf. Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 118-19 (1995) (describing judges’ aversion to revrsal); Justin
Fox & Matthew Stephenson, Judicial Review & Democratic Failure, at 6-10 (unpublished manuscript 2010),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1458632 (describing the reputational harm to bureaucrats and elected
leaders from judicial reversals). Of course, it is possible that being affirmed by the Federal Circuit is beneficial to
the PTO’s reputation. But it is unlikely to be as beneficial as being reversed is harmful. Even if it were, a risk averse
administrator would not likely choose to gamble the prospect of being reversed against an opportunity to be
affirmed. And irrespective of this calculation, the PTO has an interest in avoiding appeals of any sort for financial
reasons.
89
Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 6; Rai, supra note 11, at 2057 & n. 24 (“the PTO is an entirely fee-funded
organization”); Tony Dutra, Obama Signs Bill Increasing PTO Funding in FY 2010, But Experts Say Not Enough,
80 PCTJ 497 (2010) (noting that the PTO will be permitted to keep additional funds that it has collected and may
spend the funds on “salaries and expenses”).
90
Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A
Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 Harv. J. on
Legis. 63, 106 (2002) (explaining managers’ tendency to spend money on perks such as “nicer offices” when they
cannot keep the resources for themselves); M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense
of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 Geo. L.J. 1835 (2005) (defending this practice in the
private sector).
91
Rai notes that the PTO “has not always been able to keep all of the fees that it collects. . . . In the 1990s, for
instance, Congress diverted hundreds of millions of dollars in fee revenues from PTO coffers.” Id.; see also
Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 143 (2005); Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, PTO Fee Diversion Costs
Jobs:
Bar,
Industry
United
Against
Diversion
1
(Apr.
2003),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/feediversion.pdf (“nearly $750 million dollars have been withheld from the USPTO
in the past decade”).
92
See supra notes 36-37 (describing the attitudinal model of judging, which is driven largely by judges’ preferences
regarding the substantive content of the law).
93
Posner, supra note 75, at 118-19.
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Other than substantive policy preferences, the objectives of Federal Circuit judges are
fairly limited. They are paid in lockstep with other appellate judges94 and have essentially no
prospects for advancement.95 For most Federal Circuit judges, their current jobs are the last they
will ever hold. In addition, they undoubtedly have preferences for leisure time, and for good
relations with their colleagues.96 These will limit the number of dissents that they write, and they
will also limit the frequency with which the judges are willing to hear cases en banc (a timeconsuming, often rancorous process). But otherwise they should not much impact the judges’
substantive decision-making.
As described above, the Federal Circuit as an institution has a cutpoint along any given
legal dimension, with this cutpoint defined by existing law. As the previous sections explain,
existing precedent will exert a constraining force: judges will be at least somewhat inclined in
any given case to abide by the Circuit’s pre-existing cutpoint.97 Precedent will thus limit the
cases in which the judges will deviate from existing law. Particular judges, however, may have
individual cutpoints to the left and right of this median point.98 These individual cutpoints will
influence the judges’ behavior.99 Thus, if two judges with cutpoints to the right of the Circuit’s
cutpoint100 sit together on the same panel, they may elect to grant a patent that would not be
patentable under governing law. Conversely, if two judges with cutpoints to the left of the
Circuit sit together, they may deny a patent that should be granted under current law.101 If
Federal Circuit judges are largely homogenous—if their individual cutpoints are similarly
located—then any given three-judge panel will likely resemble the Circuit as a whole, and there
should not be a great deal of deviation from the full Circuit’s cutpoint. But if there is a great deal
of variance among Federal Circuit judges, then the possibility exists that two judges on a panel
will together form a majority with a viewpoint that diverges greatly from the Circuit’s
cutpoint.102
Finally, the judges of the Federal Circuit will simply err some proportion of the time,
voting to grant patents that should be denied and vice versa.
3.

94

The Parties’ Interaction

Judicial
Salaries
Since
1968,
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalarieschart.pdf
(listing
salaries for federal judges and members of Congress).
95
No Federal Circuit judge has ever been appointed to the Supreme Court, or to any other significant government
post. Nor has any Federal Circuit judge ever taken a substantial private-sector job upon retirement from the Circuit.
96
Posner, supra note 75, at 125-135 (describing a large class of theories of judging, all of which share this
characteristic).
97
See supra Part II.A.
98
See Petherbridge, supra note 52 (explaining this effect with respect to the Federal Circuit).
99
See supra notes 36-37 (explaining the role of individual ideology in an attitudinal model of judging).
100
These would be judges with a more permissive attitude towards what is patentable.
101
This analysis assumes that Federal Circuit judges vote “honestly”—that is, they vote their actual policy
preferences, modified only by respect for precedent, desire to avoid dissenting, and fear of reversal from the
Supreme Court. This is the most realistic description of the actual behavior of Federal Circuit judges, and it
comports with how their behavior is generally understood. Posner, supra note 75, at 183. Nonetheless, a later section
will abstract away from even this assumption.
102
Fischman, supra note 53, at 17, demonstrates this effect empirically for the Ninth Circuit.
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How, then, will the parties in this institutional arrangement behave? Consider first the
PTO. In a typical administrative system, an agency like the PTO would have no choice but to
adhere as strictly as possible to the governing law. If the agency deviated from Federal Circuit’s
caselaw, the losing party would appeal and the PTO would risk having its decision overturned.104
The further the agency deviated from the governing legal rule, the greater would be its chances
of reversal on appeal—and thus the more likely it would be that the losing party would appeal in
the first instance.105 The same is true for systems of civil litigation; the further a lower-court
judge deviates from appellate precedent, the more likely she is to be overturned by an appellate
court, and thus the more probable it is that the losing party will bring an appeal.106
103

The essential component in such a system is formal symmetry in appellate review.
Consider, for instance, an environmental regulation promulgated by the EPA. If an industry
group views the regulation as overly restrictive, it can bring a challenge in federal court; if an
environmental group views the regulation as insufficiently protective, it too can challenge the
agency’s action.107 This is not to say that industry and environmental challenges will always
arise or succeed with equal frequency. But parties on each side have equal opportunity to
challenge the regulation, and each must bear its own costs.108 Symmetric review thus exerts a
constraining force on agency behavior: the further the agency moves in either direction from
governing appellate law, the likelier its decision will be appealed and reversed.
Yet this condition does not hold for the PTO. The administrative structure of patent law
creates an asymmetry in appellate review, one that is present essentially nowhere else within the
federal bureaucracy (or the federal courts). Only PTO denials will ever be appealed. Any
applicant who receives a patent will simply depart the system, not to be heard from again until
many years later (if ever).
Of course, this asymmetry is not absolute. Improvidently granted patents may eventually
wind up in court if their owners file suit against alleged infringers. But this process is far slower
and more haphazard. The typical case of patent litigation is decided only 8.6 years after the

103

The solution to this three-party game is effectively arrived at by backwards induction: the PTO reacts to how the
Federal Circuit will behave, and private parties react to how both the PTO and the Federal Circuit will behave. This
approach should be clear from the analysis. The behavior of the relevant parties is described in this order merely for
ease of exposition and understanding.
104
5 U.S.C. § 706 (APA provision setting forth the rules for judicial review of agency action).
105
Christina L. Boyd & James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court
Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 37, 58-62 (2009) (explaining the
constraining force exerted by the threat of reversal by a higher court and the way in which this pull depends upon
precedent).
106

See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 98
(1994) (“The judge may also feel constrained by other factors, such as her belief that the intent of the framers of the
statute must be implemented, or her belief in precedent.”); Schauer, supra note 60, at 596 (describing the pull
exerted by precedent).
107
See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (establishing the rules of standing that
govern challenges to administrative actions).
108
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (describing the “American
system” in which each party typically bears its own costs).
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patent at suit was granted.109 This figure includes cases that are resolved at both the district and
appellate levels, and so it almost certainly understates the age of patents that reach the Federal
Circuit.110 By the time a patent reaches the federal courts on a suit for infringement, the
individuals who were involved with the patent’s grant—including the PTO Commissioner—will
likely have left the office.111 In addition, the PTO is not a party to these lawsuits, and thus does
not have to expend resources in litigation. It also cannot be declared the “losing party” in typical
terms. The prospect of having a patent declared invalid in the course of infringement litigation is
not insignificant for the PTO. But it is far less salient important than the threat of direct appeals
from the agency’s patenting decisions.
How, then, is the PTO likely to behave? If the patent office simply attempted to match
the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint—tried to follow the law, that is—it would undoubtedly err in some
cases. There errors would produce both false negatives and false positives: the PTO would grant
some patents that the Federal Circuit would not hold valid, and it would deny some patents that
the Federal Circuit believes should be granted. False positives are not particularly costly to the
patent office; in those cases, the patentee is simply be granted a questionable patent, and the
PTO’s labors end. But false negatives give rise to appeals and likely reversals by the Federal
Circuit, at significant expense to the PTO.112
Accordingly, one would expect the self-interested administrators of the patent office to
minimize the number of appeals and reversals wherever possible. The PTO could avoid review
and reversal simply by approving every patent—or at least every patent that the Federal Circuit
might plausibly grant. Yet the patent office does face some constraints: if it were to grant
literally every patent, or even every vaguely plausible patent, it would presumably face harsh
criticism or even sanction from Congress, the President, and the patenting community.113
The PTO is thus forced to deny some patents, but it will err on the side of approving
every application that the Federal Circuit is at all likely to grant. In other words, the patent office
will treat the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint as more of a floor than an optimal target. So long as the
PTO is at least as lenient as the Federal Circuit, it has little reason to fear reversal. And the more
lenient the PTO is (subject to constraints from Congress or the patenting community), the less
likely it is to be reversed. The PTO loses little by this strategy. Although improperly granted

109

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q. J.
185, 234-240 (1998); see also John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 477 (2004) (providing
similar data).
110
Allison & Lemley, supra note 109, at 236.
111
There have been six PTO Commissioners since 1993, none of whom has held the job for more than five years.
See
Under
Secretary
of
Commerce
for
Intellectual
Property,
available
at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Under_Secretary_of_Commerce_for_Intellectual_Property. Generally speaking, very
few government employees remain in their jobs longer than eight years. However, precise information regarding
lower-level employees at the PTO is difficult to acquire. See Mark Lemley and Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner
Characteristics and the Patent Grant Rate (unpublished manuscript 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329091(“A first problem is data: we lack direct information about whether examiners are
tenured or untenured.”).
112
See supra Part II.A.3.
113
The PTO is obviously already bumping up against this constraint. See supra note 9 and sources cited therein.
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patents can impose severe costs on other private parties (or the economy at large),114 the
individuals who govern the PTO do not internalize these costs.115 The result is that the PTO will
set its cutpoint far enough to the right of the Federal Circuit’s to ensure that it will not errantly
deny a patent application that the Federal Circuit will later errantly grant. In addition, by
minimizing the chance of being overturned by the Federal Circuit, the PTO will hope to
minimize the number of inventors who even bother to appeal. Figure 6 figure represents this
strategy graphically, with the areas of potential error again shaded:
Figure 6: The Federal Circuit and PTO in Combination
Federal Circuit cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

PTO cutpoint
More permissive
patentability standard

The Federal Circuit’s cutpoint is public information, though it may be costly to discover:
inventors can simply read the Federal Circuit’s published opinions. But the PTO’s cutpoint is
private information. Inventors will understand that the PTO will be more permissive than the
Federal Circuit, but they cannot know by how much. They will also be uncertain of the PTO and
Federal Circuit’s rates of error.
In anticipation of the a lenient PTO, inventors have strong incentives to file even dubious
patent applications.116 Inventors will get two bites at the apple: the PTO might grant a patent that
exceeds the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint; and even if the PTO does not grant the patent, a favorable
panel of Federal Circuit judges might do so. Consequently, inventors will file applications for
patentable inventions in large numbers, and will file substantial quantities of applications on
unpatentable inventions as well. The PTO will thus produce true positives (patents it should
grant and does), false positives (patents it should not grant but does, out of an abundance of
caution), and true negatives. This third category is made up of patents that exceed the Federal
Circuit’s cutpoint and may or may not exceed the PTO’s cutpoint as well, and that the PTO
denies, either as a matter of random error, or because they are too outlandish even for that
agency. However, the PTO will generate extremely few false negatives—patents that the Federal
Circuit would normally approve, but that the PTO denies. Avoiding false negatives—and the
114

See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (analyzing the negative effects of a crowded patent field on innovation and
market entrance); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 101 (2006) (analyzing the harm that even unenforced patents can do to competitors and consumers within the
marketplace).
115
PTO administrators might be forced to internalize these costs if private parties complained about excessive
patenting to political leaders, who then took action or asserted pressure against the patent office. However, as noted
above, private interests are arrayed roughly evenly in favor and against broader patent rights. See Long, supra note
83, at 15. More to the point, in many industries a particular firm might both own and be accused of violating patents
that would be invalid under a strict interpretation of Federal Circuit precedent. There is thus no natural constituency
positioned to oppose excessive patent grants by the PTO.
116
Of course, they have even far stronger incentives to file for valid patents, as there is every expectation that such
patents will be granted.
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likelihood of appeal and reversal—is the PTO’s reason for setting its cutpoint to the right of the
Federal Circuit’s.
4.

Granted Patents and Expansionary Doctrine

Consider now the results of the institutional interaction between the PTO and the Federal
Circuit. Figure 7 is a schematic representation of how the PTO will dispose of the variety of
patent applications presented to it. The dots arrayed horizontally along the patentability spectrum
represent patent applications. The further left the dot, the more obviously patentable it is; the
further right, the more obviously unpatentable it is. Blue dots represent (hypothetical) PTO
patent grants; red dots are hypothetical patent denials. As the preceding sections explained, the
PTO will grant nearly all applications that fall to the left of its cutpoint and deny nearly all
applications that fall to the right of its cutpoint.117 From time to time, random errors and
heterogeneity among patent examiners will cause the PTO to grant a patent to the right of its
cutpoint or deny a patent to the left of its cutpoint. (In Figure 7, the PTO has granted one
application to the right of its cutpoint and denied one application to the left of its cutpoint.)
However, because the PTO will deliberately set its cutpoint to the right of the Federal Circuit’s
cutpoint, it will not deny any applications that the Federal Circuit would typically grant.118
Figure 7: The PTO’s Treatment of Patent Applications
Federal Circuit cutpoint

PTO cutpoint

Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

PTO grants
PTO denials

As an initial matter, it is important to note that the PTO’s actions will generate a
substantial number of invalid patents, just as commentators have observed.119 Consider just the
granted patents from Figure 7.
Figure 8: Granted Patents
Federal Circuit cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

PTO cutpoint
More permissive
patentability standard

PTO grants
117

See supra Part II.D.3.

118

Id.

119

See supra note 9 and sources cited therein.
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Of these granted patents, some number of them will fall to the right of the Federal Circuit’s
cutpoint, simply by virtue of the fact that the PTO has set its own cutpoint to the right of the
Federal Circuit’s. Figure 9 displays just these patents.
Figure 9: Improperly Granted Patents
Federal Circuit cutpoint

PTO cutpoint

Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

PTO grants

These are the false negatives the PTO will grant in an effort to avoid reversal—the invalid
patents that scholars have decried as a cost to the system and a drag upon innovation.120
What effect will the PTO’s strategy have upon the shape of patent law? As the preceding
section explained, when the PTO grants a patent there can be no appeal to the Federal Circuit,
and thus no opportunity for the Federal Circuit to shift the law. Only patent denials can lead to
substantive legal changes.121 Figure 10 displays the patent applications that have been denied by
the PTO.
Figure 10: Denied Patents
Federal Circuit cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

PTO cutpoint
More permissive
patentability standard

PTO denials

Importantly, the vast majority of these patent denials will fall to the right of the Federal
Circuit’s cutpoint. (That is, they will be true negatives—applications that the PTO should deny
and does.) This is precisely the PTO’s intent in setting its own cutpoint to the right of the Federal
Circuit’s: to minimize the number of applications it denies that the Federal Circuit might later
grant. There is thus a pronounced asymmetry in patent appeals: nearly every case that the Federal
Circuit hears on direct appeal from the PTO will concern a boundary-pushing patent, one that it
would ordinarily deny under governing law.122
120

See supra notes 9 & 16-21 (describing the proliferation of invalid patents and their costs).
Again, to be specific there are two mechanisms by which the question of patent validity could present itself to the
Federal Circuit. True and false negatives may be appealed directly to the court; true and false positives might find
their way before the court if they are involved in suits for infringement. This second mode is discussed further
below.
122
In Figure 10, no PTO denials fall to the left of the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint. Of course, this is merely a graphical
representation, and occasionally the PTO may deny a patent to the left of the circuit’s cutpoint. The point is simply
121
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In some cases, a disappointed patent applicant will not bother to appeal to the Federal
Circuit, figuring that it is unlikely to convince the Circuit to grant the patent. And in many cases
when the applicant does appeal, the Federal Circuit will affirm the PTO and deny the patent.
After all, nearly all of these denials will involve inventions that the Federal Circuit does not
believe are patentable. Recall that these affirmances will leave the law unchanged. Because the
PTO’s denial was in accordance with governing law, the Federal Circuit can simply affirm based
on that existing precedent.123
However, every once in a while, as a matter of random chance or because of a favorable
panel draw, the Federal Circuit will grant one of these patents.124 In Figure 11, this decision by
the Federal Circuit is represented by a yellow dot.
Figure 11: The Occasional Federal Circuit Patent Grant
Federal Circuit cutpoint

PTO cutpoint

Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

Federal Circuit
grant
PTO denials

When the Federal Circuit overturns a PTO denial in this fashion, it creates a new
precedent—one that expands the boundaries of patentability. The Federal Circuit’s cutpoint will
shift rightward because of the force of this new precedent. Figure 12 displays this effect:
Figure 12: Patent Inflation
New Federal Circuit PTO cutpoint
cutpoint
Stricter patentability
standard

More permissive
patentability standard

Federal Circuit
grant
PTO denials

that PTO denials will be heavily biased to the right of the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint. Even if a few fall to the left,
they will be well outweighed by the many denials on the other side.
123

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

124

See id.
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The result is patent inflation: outward growth in the boundaries of what inventions may
be patented. Even if every new patent doesn’t stretch the boundaries of patentability to their
fullest extent (as indicated by Figure 12), each precedent will exert some additional force. When
the next case arises, Federal Circuit judges will be slightly more likely to rule in favor of
patentability. And because the PTO will continue to move its own cutpoint to the right in order to
provide itself with the necessary margin of error and avoid reversals, the cycle will repeat. Each
time the Federal Circuit moves its cutpoint slightly, the PTO will do the same. The agency will
continue to send primarily boundary-stretching cases to the circuit. And the boundaries of
patentability will continue to expand outward—just as they have since the advent of the Federal
Circuit.125
5.

Patent Inflation and Suits for Infringement

At the same time, the PTO will also generate true and false positives—the many patents it
grants. These patents could eventually arrive before the Federal Circuit in the course of a suit for
infringement. False positives present additional opportunities for the Federal Circuit to expand
the scope of what is patentable; true positives provide chances to contract it. At first glance, it
might appear that the latter of these effects should dominate. There will be many more true
positives than false positives, simply because such a large percentage of patent applications
submitted to the PTO will be patentable under existing law. Accordingly, one might imagine that
infringement lawsuits will mainly afford the Federal Circuit opportunities to contract patent
scope, and that this will balance the effect of the true negatives appealed directly to the court.
Yet this is not the case. Not every patent involved in an infringement suit is equally likely
to have its validity adjudicated by the Federal Circuit. The reason is that parties will are more
likely to settle obvious cases with certain outcomes, leaving only close cases for the circuit to
decide. In any type of civil litigation, settlement is driven by certainty: the more that the parties
agree on the probable outcome at trial, the more likely they are to settle.126 The cases that will
reach trial—much less appeal—are those in which the outcome is uncertain.127 All things being
equal, the more well-established a question of patentability is, the less likely it is to be presented
to the courts for review. If a patent is obviously valid or invalid—far to the left or right of the
Federal Circuit’s cutpoint—there is no reason to expend the resources necessary to have the
court adjudicate it. Accordingly, the patents that reach the appellate court in infringement suits
should be clustered around the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint—sometimes slightly to the left,
sometimes slightly to the right, but always close enough to the cutpoint that the outcome of the
case is uncertain.128
125

126

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973). The reason is the
transaction costs involved in litigation. If the parties can agree regarding what a judge and jury will do, there is no
reason for them to incur the transaction costs of actually undergoing a trial just to reach that outcome. Id.; see also
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil
Lawsuits, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1516, 1520-1522 (2008) (explaining this point).
127
See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973) (seeking to show why a larger
percentage of lawsuits are settled out of court and providing hypothesis about what causes cases to go to trial).
128
Cf. id. at 285 (describing the types of cases that will reach trial and appeal).
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Moreover, the number of cases to the left and right of the cutpoint should be relatively
equivalent. The reasons are twofold. First, the level of uncertainty in cases to the right and left of
the cutpoint should be relatively equal.129 And second, the number of patents that are just to the
left and right of the cutpoint should be approximately equal: the PTO will endeavor to grant
every application that is near the Federal Circuit’s cutpoint, even if slightly to the right of it.130
As a result, cases that reach the Federal Circuit via suits for infringement will provide the Circuit
with approximately symmetric opportunities to expand and contract the boundaries of
patentability.
The result will be a net inflationary pressure on the frontiers of patent law. Cases that
arrive at the Circuit through infringement (true and false positives) will present symmetric
opportunities for expansion and contraction; cases that are directly appealed (true negatives) will
provide asymmetric opportunities for expansion. On the whole, the Federal Circuit will be
presented with more and better opportunities to enlarge the boundaries of patentability than to
narrow them. There will be an overall gravity in the direction of more permissive patent rules.131
This is exactly the trend that scholars have observed over the past several decades.132 Notably,
however, it does not necessarily depend on any ideological preference on the part of the Federal
Circuit133 or on any notion of agency capture.134 This inflationary effect is generated through a
combination of only three individually unremarkable factors: asymmetric appeals from the PTO,
self-interest on the part of the agency, and occasional noise or error on by the Federal Circuit.
Nothing else is required to produce a gradual outward creep in the scope of the law.
E.

A Strategic Federal Circuit

One important feature of the preceding discussion is that two—and only two—of the
three actors involved behave strategically. Inventors make strategic decisions regarding which
applications to file, and the PTO makes strategic decisions regarding which patents to grant in
order to avoid review and reversal. The Federal Circuit, by contrast, makes “honest” decisions—
each judge votes based on precedent and her own preferences.

129

See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4–5 (1984)
(proposing that this symmetry in uncertainty will lead to symmetric results at trial, with plaintiffs and defendants
each winning approximately 50% of cases). If anything, cases to the right of the cutpoint—involving patents that
push the frontiers of the law—should be more uncertain.
130
See supra Part I.A.1. It is of course possible that relatively well-established patentability questions will reach the
Federal Circuit as companions to less certain infringement issues within a single lawsuit. Yet these will not likely
provide a source of much movement in the law. Lawyers will for the defendant will be unlikely to push the issue of
validity, and courts will most commonly opt to decide the case on the easier (infringement) grounds. Cf. Adam B.
Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1493 (2007) (demonstrating that judges will decide cases on easier grounds that involve less contravention of
precedent and possibility of reversal whenever such grounds are available to them).
131
This is of course not to say that the law will always move exclusively in the direction of more lenient standards of
patentability. The effect is an overall one—in the net, the law will expand the boundaries outward. Along the way,
however, it will presumably move in fits and starts.
132
See supra note 10 and sources cited therein.
133
See supra note 15 and sources cited therein.
134
See supra note 14 and sources cited therein.
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It is of course possible to imagine relaxing this assumption as well; judges could
themselves behave strategically. Here, Federal Circuit judges would understand that natural
mechanisms of selection and appeal will tend to expand the boundaries of patentability. In
response, they might take a number of steps. They might make special efforts to create new,
more constraining law in the course of rejecting an invention that is unpatentable under existing
law, contrary to typical judicial practice135 They might also vote strategically against self-interest
in certain cases. For instance, a judge could vote against granting a patent that she would prefer
to see issued simply in order to put forestall the law’s outward momentum, figuring that without
such action the law would eventually expand beyond her cutpoint.
It is possible that Federal Circuit judges are engaging in this type of strategic behavior,
but it is quite unlikely. The judges would have to be aware of the expansion of patent law and
understand that it is a natural consequence of the asymmetry in PTO appeals, rather than simply
a reflection of the median circuit judge’s preferences. (If it were the latter, this type of strategic
action would be unproductive.) This would require a focus on issues with which circuit judges do
not typically concern themselves, not to mention a surprising level of tactical shrewdness from a
circuit that has not previously displayed any such inclination.136
Perhaps this issue is best understood from the opposite perspective. It is undeniable that
the Federal Circuit has significantly expanded the boundaries of what is patentable and the rights
of patent-holders over the past two decades.137 Scholars have posited various reasons for this
trend, including pro-patent ideology and the possibility that the Circuit has been captured by propatent interests.138 Although these accounts may be correct, this article has suggested that the
expansion in patentability can be explained without any of them. It may be wholly or in part a
natural consequence of the institutional relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit. If
judges of the Federal Circuit are acting strategically in order to frustrate this natural momentum,
then the expansion of patentability over the past two decades must be due to some other factor,
such as ideology or capture. This would mean that Federal Circuit judges were acting
strategically in order to frustrate an expansion of the law that they themselves favored. Such a
peculiar confluence of motives and actions seems highly unlikely.
F.

Congress, the Supreme Court, and Patent Remedies

The effects described above are endemic to the relationship between PTO and the Federal
Circuit. Congress and the Supreme Court are not subject to similar pressures and selection
effects. Accordingly, those two bodies might well act as checks on the PTO and Federal Circuit,
were they to play active roles in shaping the law.
For its part, Congress has been largely an absentee landlord; the last major patent
legislation was passed in 1952.139 For many years after the creation of the Federal Circuit, the
135

See Schauer, supra note 60, at 589.
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See supra note 10.
138
See supra notes 14-15 and sources cited therein.
139
Long, supra note 14, at 1968.
136

August 9, 2010

PATENT INFLATION

29

Supreme Court was similarly reticent and granted certiorari in very few patent cases.140 This
might have been due to the technical complexity of patent cases, the Court’s belief that the
Federal Circuit possessed greater patent expertise, or even the Court’s satisfaction with the shape
and direction of the law. Lately, however, the trend has relaxed, and the Supreme Court has
decided seven patent cases since 2005.141 Commentators have suggested that the Court has lately
become dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit’s stewardship of patent law and is acting to rein in
the circuit’s expansionary tendencies.142
This could be a welcome corrective. But it is not complete. Even an aggressive Supreme
Court cannot staunch the flow of improperly granted patents from the PTO. The PTO will still
possess an incentive to grant every application that the Federal Circuit might conceivably allow,
irrespective of where the courts set the legal cutpoint. Without external adjustment of the PTO’s
incentives, the PTO will continue to err in the direction of granting more patents than it should. It
is also difficult to rely on continued activism on the part of the Supreme Court, given the recent
nature of that trend.
How, then, can the problems of bad patents and inflationary law best be remedied? One
option would be for Congress or the President to recalibrate the PTO’s incentives by providing
additional funding for the agency to litigate appeals, removing the stigma of reversal, or
evaluating the agency based on the quality of the patents it issues without regard to which patents
are eventually litigated.143 Yet these reforms might be politically difficult to implement, in part
because they differ so dramatically from the panoply of proposals that have already been
suggested and debated.144
Perhaps the most promising solution is a familiar one: a system of inter partes review that
allowed outside parties to challenge a patent before it issued.145 However, a purely administrative
challenge system located entirely within the PTO—the reform typically suggested—would not
be sufficient. Such a system would undoubtedly provide the PTO with better information
regarding the validity of a putative patent and enable it to make a more accurate decision, but it
would not cure the agency’s fundamental incentive to grant, rather than deny, borderline patents.
Rather, the crucial ingredient would be an opportunity for challengers who lose before the PTO
to appeal to the Federal Circuit—in other words, a mechanism for symmetric review of PTO
140
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decisions. The possibility that aggrieved parties could appeal both patent denials and patent
grants would discipline the PTO. With little to gain from an overly permissive stance, the agency
would be forced to evaluate patent applications as much in accordance with governing law as
possible. The agency would be more likely to make symmetric errors around its own (and the
Federal Circuit’s) cutpoint, and the cases that reached the Federal Circuit would be more equally
divided between false negatives and false positives.146 Accordingly, the Circuit would have
approximately as many opportunities to expand the law as to contract it, muting the inflationary
effect.
There are undoubtedly a variety of other reforms that would have salutary effects on PTO
and Federal Circuit behavior. But if the patent system’s malfunctions are indeed attributable in
part to the institutional relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit, it seems appropriate to
deploy an institutional corrective in response.
III. The Patenting of Software and Business Methods
As a means of demonstrating this interaction in practice, this section presents a case study
of the development of the patentable subject matter rules concerning software and business
method patents, culminating in the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Bilski.147
Whether an invention recites patentable subject matter is of course only one of the many hurdles
to patentability, but it is perhaps the subject most at the forefront of debates over the scope of
patent law (due in large part to the Bilski decisions).148
The last two decades have seen a rapid expansion in the patenting of intangible processes
such as software and business methods. Bilski may have represented a slight retrenchment by the
Federal Circuit—which was then quickly followed by a PTO-led reinvigoration of permissive
patentability rules. In combination, the PTO and the Federal Circuit seem determined to push the
boundaries of patentability, perhaps even despite their own best intentions.
A.

Software Patents, Business Methods, and State Street Bank

As recently as 1981, it was only by a five-to-four vote that the Supreme Court held that
an inventor could patent a method for curing rubber.149 By the mid 1990s, however, the PTO and
the Federal Circuit were presiding over a rapid expansion of the boundaries of patentable subject
matter, an expansion that encompassed a variety of processes and methods far more intangible
than the rubber-curing method.150 This expansion began with patents on software methods,
which the Federal Circuit and the PTO began to allow so long as they were linked in some
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fashion to a standard computer.151 Within a few years software patents had become relatively
well-accepted.152 The PTO and Federal Circuit then turned their attention to patents on business
methods.153
Scholars and courts have struggled to define a “business method” (as distinct from any
other type of patentable process). Nonetheless, they have managed to coalesce around a general
understanding: a business method is a means of doing business and turning a profit that is
typically inchoate and unconnected from the production of any tangible good.154 The PTO
describes business methods in similar terms.155 Included in this definition are methods for
reducing the amount of taxes an individual must pay, methods for creating and selling financial
products, methods for structuring transactions between a business and a customer,156 and
methods for reducing risk or creating other advantageous business conditions.157
The Federal Circuit first squarely addressed whether business methods constituted
patentable subject matter158 in 1998, in State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group.159 There,
the court that an inventor could patent “a data processing system . . for implementing an
investment structure,” though it suggested that it was important that the process by tied to a
machine of some sort.160 Signature Financial Group’s patent claimed not only a very general
“computer processor means,” but also some specific structures for storing and retrieving data and
making various types of calculations.161 The Federal Circuit thus held the invention patentable,
but without reaching the question of whether the patent must necessarily involve a machine, or
what requirements that machine must meet.162 By any measure, the Signature patent qualified.
B.

Bilski in the Courts

State Street Bank “opened the floodgates on business method patents.”163 Over the next
decade, inventors patented a wide variety of business methods with little impedance (or
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guidance) from the Federal Circuit. A decade later, the Federal Circuit again took up the issue in
In re Bilski.164
Bernard Bilski had filed for an application on “[a] method for managing the consumption
risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price.”165 Bilski was
effectively attempting to patent the idea of hedging risk: a consumer of a good (for instance, a
power company that used coal as fuel) would purchase that commodity at a fixed price from a
producer (namely the coal company).166 The consumer would be protected against a rise in the
price of the commodity; the producer would be protected against a fall in the price.167
Importantly, this patent application—one which Bernard Bilski had elected to appeal to
the Federal Circuit—was an outlandish one by the standards of business method patents. Unlike
the patent in State Street,168 Bilski did not attach any sort of machine to his claims.169 They were
merely free-standing money-making ideas, unmoored from any connection to the physical
world.170 It is thus not surprising that Bilski’s application, which pushed beyond the boundaries
set by State Street, was the one to make it to the court.
Bilski’s invention is undoubtedly unpatentable on any number of grounds,171 not least of
all the fact that it has been a well-understood economic concept for centuries.172 But before the
court reached that issue173 it held that the invention was merely an abstract idea and thus
constituted unpatentable subject matter.174 The Federal Circuit declared that a process can be
patented only if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”175 Because Bilski’s invention involved neither a
machine nor the transformation of any matter, it failed the Federal Circuit’s test.176
The Federal Circuit’s resolution of Bilski immediately called into questions vast swaths
of existing patents. In addition to patents on business methods, Bilski threatened tax177 and
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software178 patents, which similarly do not involve any obvious transformation of matter and
need not always be linked to machines. Yet the Federal Circuit’s opinion left open perhaps the
most crucial question: could a general-purpose computer satisfy the “machine” prong of the test,
or must the machine be specially adapted to the claimed process in some fashion? For Bilski, the
question was irrelevant—his patent claimed no computer whatsoever.179 But for many other
inventors, this question was decisive. Every software invention requires a computer to run, and
most modern business methods and tax patents cannot be practiced without a computer of some
sort as well.180 These computers are rarely specialized to the task at hand; by and large, a
standard personal computer will suffice.181 If Bilski were interpreted to require only a general
computer, most of these patents would remain valid, and it would be easy for inventors to draft
valid, enforceable claims going forward. If a more specialized type of machine were necessary,
however, Bilski might jeopardize entire fields of patents.
C.

Bilski Before the PTO

The issue of general purpose computers was thus left to the PTO. Initially, the PTO took
the position that a process claim must include “a particular machine” to be valid.182 The PTO
rejected a number of patents on the ground that “[a]ny and all computing systems will suffice
[under the terms of the claim], indicating that the claim is not directed to the function of any
particular machine.”183 Through the middle of 2009, approximately six months after the Federal
Circuit had handed down Bilski, the PTO held to the view that general purpose computers did not
qualify as “machines” under governing Federal Circuit law.184
However, in July of 2009, the PTO shifted its stance. In Ex Parte Dickerson, it granted a
patent on a “computerized method” of optimizing business performance.185 The agency argued
that the invention “include[s] a step of outputting information from a computer . . . and therefore,
[is] tied to a particular machine or apparatus.”186 The machine in Dickerson was not at all
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particular: the claims called only for a general-purpose computer.187 The PTO’s reversal did not
go unnoticed; even the chief judge of the circuit observed that the circuit had taken “inconsistent
approaches” to the issue of general purpose computers since Bilski.188
The PTO’s behavior was entirely predictable and consistent with the model developed
above. The initial rulings in which the PTO demanded “particular” machines, rather than merely
general computers, may well have been the PTO’s best guess as to how the Federal Circuit
would decide the issue. Yet the agency was not content with that approach. The PTO had nothing
to gain and quite a bit to lose if it attempted to hold the line against inventions that the Federal
Circuit might eventually accept. Faced with uncertain law, it elected to err on the side of granting
patents, rather than denying them, opting for a rule under which even general-purpose computers
sufficed for purposes of patentability.189
The result will be a proliferation of software, tax, and business method patents involving
only a general-purpose computer. In most cases this is a trivial additional limitation, and one that
should not greatly inhibit inventors from obtaining and enforcing valuable patents.
Had the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision stood, and had the PTO continued to grant
patents on processes attached to general computers, the cases finding their way to the Federal
Circuit would likely have involved inventions that challenged the frontiers of patentability even
more directly. The Federal Circuit would have seen few patents involving general computers,
most of which the PTO would simply have granted. Rather, PTO denials might have involved
even more general sorts of machines, such as a general apparatus for adding and subtracting, or
business methods that did not require machines but claimed to transform matter in some fashion.
Over time, one might have expected to see the boundaries of patentability advance once again.
Of course, the Federal Circuit’s Bilski decision did not stand long. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari190 and announced that the Federal Circuit could not treat the machine-ortransformation test as determinative of patentability.191 While that test might be “a useful and
important clue,”192 at bottom the Federal Circuit must ascertain whether the invention is an
“abstract idea” in order to determine whether it is patentable.193 The law has thus been returned
to a state of substantial uncertainty, and it will remain for the Federal Circuit to sort out its
particularities in the years to come. And as the PTO reacts to these new rules, it will likely send
the Circuit an ever-advancing wave of boundary-pushing patent denials, primed for conversion
into new, inflationary law.
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Conclusion
In recent years the Patent and Trademark Office and the Federal Circuit have been widely
criticized for their poor stewardship of the patent system. The PTO grants significant numbers of
invalid patents, while the Federal Circuit has radically expanded the boundaries of what can be
patented. These problems have been attributed to a variety of causes, including mismanagement
and underfunding at the PTO, a lack of expertise, interest-group capture, and an ideological
preference in favor of extensive patenting. Each of these factors may be responsible to some
degree. But the problems that plague patent law can be explained without reference to any of
them. The PTO’s interest in avoiding appeals and reversals, coupled with the Federal Circuit’s
asymmetric review of PTO decisions, are themselves enough to generate a surplus of invalid
patents and an inflationary patent law. The patent system’s dysfunction may be partly (or even
entirely) a consequence of the relationship between the PTO and Federal Circuit. If this is indeed
the case, policymakers should seek institutional remedies to what is fundamentally an
institutional problem.
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